THE
Occaſional Patriot;
OR, AN
ENQUIRY
Into the PRESENT
Connections of *Great Britain*
WITH THE
CONTINENT.

Viſam, Britannos, hoſpitibus, feros.
HOR.

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THE

Occaſional Patriot.

My LORD.

THE Philoſopher prov'd *Motion* by *moving*. In like Manner, the *Exerciſe* of Liberty eſtabliſhes its *Exiſtence*; and every Man who, with Impunity, publicly complains of its being abridged, furniſhes, in his own Writings, an Evidence to contradict himſelf.

The *Liberty of the Preſs* has, in this Country, generally been underſtood to be the Privilege of admoniſhing, or correcting, our Superiors, in whatever was thought to be amiſs, either in Religion, or

or Government. It cannot be denied, that through various Periods of our Conſtitution, the Exerciſe of this Liberty, has firſt *awakened*, and then *alarmed* the People of *England*, to a juſt Senſe, not only of their *Rights*, but of their *Importance*. Thoſe Princes, under whom this *Spirit* was moſt check'd, were generally the greateſt Sufferers from its *Efforts*. The Steed that receives a Bridle, will not always bear a Curb; nor will he require one, if he is manag'd by a ſkilful Rider. But it often happens, that, by throwing the Reins upon his Neck, he runs himſelf out of Breath, till he grows ſo tame that he is uſeleſs.

A Writer in the Oppoſition to Government has many Advantages over one of equal Abilities, who defends it. He has all the Fields of ancient and modern Eloquence to range over: He can compoſe his Chaplet of the choiceſt Flowers they afford, and all of us are apt to ſide with the

the Champion for our *ſuffering Country*. He may *advance* Facts, which his Antagoniſt may not (tho' he could) be at Liberty to *diſprove*; therefore, they are taken for granted. He has the moſt *pathetic Figures* of Rhetoric at his Service, tho' his Antagoniſt, without incurring Ridicule, dare not venture at a *ſingle Trope*. The ſtreams of *Bilingsgate* furniſh him with *Epithets*, which, in his Adverſary, would be downright *Inſolence of Power* to make uſe of; and the Spirit of Jealouſy, which is, and, I hope, ever will be, awake in the Country, is always ready to befriend his Cauſe to juſtify his Suſpicions.

Theſe are a few, of the many, Reaſons why we have ſeen Gentlemen (for Writers and Speakers are the ſame) cut a great Figure in an Oppoſition, and when they came into Government, durſt not attempt to riſe above *plain Facts*, and *common Senſe*. But it gives me concern, that in the Senſe in which I have ſtated it, the *Liberty of the*

the Preſs in *England* is now no more. We have a great deal *publiſhed*, but nothing *wrote*, and, to uſe a typographical Term, we have a great deal *Printed* but nothing *Compoſed*, to prove that *Spirit*, which is the *Soul* of *Liberty*, to be now alive. The Papers and Pamphlets publiſh'd againſt the Government ſeem to be the joint Reſult of *Bedlam* and *Bridewell*; in their *Manner* there is nothing *liberal*, nor in their *Matter*, *intelligible*; with great *Abuſe* they contain no *Satyr*; and, with infinite *Scurrility*, no *Amuſement*.

Fir'd with Indignation at perceiving the Palladium of the Britiſh Conſtitution in Danger of being utterly loſt, I reſolv'd to be an *Occaſional Patriot*. I ſnatch'd my Pen, I made ready my Paper, and I ſate me down to write, with an Intention, if poſſible, to ſave the Oppoſition of the Preſs from being preſcrib'd, and to keep open the Title, which the Succeſſors to the Patriots of paſt Ages have to enter

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their *Claim of Right* to be heard before the Tribunal of the Public, againſt all miniſterial Influence, and every Abuſe of Power.

Poſſeſs'd of this laudable Spirit, I dipp'd into the Hiſtory of the beſt, as well as of the worſt, of *Engliſh* Reigns. I made a Collection from *Matthew Paris*, *Bracton*, *Walſingham*, *Harrington*, *Bacon*, *Sidney*, and other Champions for *Engliſh* Liberty, of *ſhrew'd* Sayings and *Patriot* Sentiments. I rang'd them under their proper Heads, and omitted no Vice either *Perſonal* or *Political*, that is to be found in any Order of Government, from the Lord-High-Treaſurer down to the petty Clerk of an Office. Furniſh'd with this Artillery I proceeded to plant it; but alas! after many thundering Efforts, I found no Object of Reſiſtance, and that, ſhould I open my Trenches, I muſt fire away Powder to no purpoſe.

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Not a little nettled at this diſappointment, I commenc'd a Review of Public Affairs, ſince I enter'd upon the Stage of Life, in hopes of finding out ſome Blemiſhes of Government that had been unknown to our Anceſtors, and in which the Pens of our Modern Patriots only could be converſant. But how different was this *Review* from the *Repreſentation* itſelf. How differently do Things appear when *collected*, than they did when *tranſacted!* How dangerous is Power, when it becomes invidious! And how difficult is it to ſeparate Envy from Merit? That great Miniſter who has been call'd the Father of Publick Corruption, once in his Life-time had Merit with the People of *England*. But an Oppoſition was form'd againſt him of ſuch Weight, for Numbers, Property and Abilities, that he could not maintain his Power without enlarging it, nor could he enlarge it, but by thoſe Means that fed the Conflagration, which

was beginning to mount too high for the Public Safety.

A Miniſter, in this Situation, could not, without poſſeſſing the Spirit of Martyrdom to a Degree of Enthuſiaſm, act up to the Dictates of pure diſintereſted Patriotiſm; and the ſmalleſt Deviation from them was conſtrued by the ingenious Pens of his Adverſaries into a Revival of the Power of the *French Mayors of the Palace*, which at laſt annihilated that of the *Sovereign*. I can appeal to every Gentleman, who remembers the Tranſactions of thoſe Days, whether this was not the perpetual Language of Oppoſition both *without* and *within* Doors, till all Order and Subordination of Rank was endanger'd; and till the Wiſdom and Moderation of his Majeſty found out thoſe happy Expedients which reconcil'd his *Safety* to his *Honour*, and *the Dignity of his Crown* to *the Intereſt of his People?*

But alarming as that Juncture was, when the *Breath of Oppoſition* meeting with the *Tide of Power* ſeem'd to threaten a Tempeſt, many great and important Advantages reſulted from the Danger. Several *national*, nay, ſome *conſtitutional* Points had been explain'd during the Heat of the Conteſt. Some of them the Miniſter *could* not comply with, nor *durſt* he, with others. The War with *Spain* was a Meaſure ſo peculiarly Circumſtanc'd, that *Juſtice* ſeem'd to direct him to one Courſe, and *Policy* to another, while both were equally incompatible with his Safety. Nothing was more eaſy then, and nothing is more eaſy now, than for thoſe who are under the Influence either of Miſtake or Intereſt, to impoſe upon a *Britiſh* Houſe of Commons, when their Evidence is ſtrongly recommended and warmly ſupported; and where the Circumſtance of *not ſpeaking upon Oath*, is very quieting to a Conſcience, if its Owner, as often happen'd at that Time,

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has been irritated, or provoked by the Party complained of. In ſuch a Caſe, the Ear that perhaps has been loſt in a *Pillory*, claims the Veneration that is due to a *Relick*; and the Puniſhment of a *Pirate* is conſtrued into the Sufferings of a *Patriot*. To ſpeak plainly, and what are really my own Sentiments, I believe many Things that never happen'd, appear'd as Facts to the Legiſlature, and many well meaning Members entertained Reſentments of which they were afterwards aſhamed.

It prov'd, however, unfortunate for the Miniſter, that the Principles were *true* tho' the Facts were *falſe*. He *could* not *diſprove* the *one*, nor *durſt* he *diſpute* the other. The foundation of our Differences with *Spain* lay in their having interrupted our Rights to a free Navigation upon the *American* Seas; which. tho' it had not been ſtipulated by Treaties, we ought to enjoy to as full an Extent as any Power

in *Europe*. This Principle was too plain and intereſting, tho' it had not been *enflam'd* by *Injuries*, and *aggravated* by *Inſults*, not to engage the Public in the Quarrel. It was in vain, and at laſt it became even dangerous, for him to plead, that the Law of Nations, and immemorial Practice, in all Countries, gave the *Spaniards* a right to Guard their Coaſts from an illicit Trade, which had been ſo often provided againſt by the moſt ſolemn Treaties. The beſt Pens in the Nation were drawn againſt him; his *Authors* wanted the *Capacity* to ſet the Matter in its true Light.; his Adverſaries carry'd all before them with the Public, and tho' he *ſtruggled* to *preſerve Peace*, yet when the Criſis came, he *ſubmitted* to *commence War*.

But even this Period was attended with Public Advantages. The Quarrel between *Great Britain* and *Spain* had been ſo well explain'd from the Preſs, that both Na-

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tions acquired juſt Notions of the *Equity* as well as the *Importance*, of their ſeveral Pretenſions. Theſe Notions were improv'd and verify'd by the Progreſs of the War, which, like a Suit before the Commons between Huſband and Wife, was maintained upon the ſame Purſe; while the *French*, like Lawyers, run away with the Profit. Mutual *Intereſt* at laſt led them to a mutual *Underſtanding*. It was found on both Sides expedient to depart from Extremes, and to ſoften the *Incompatibility of Demands*, by a *Moderation of Meaſures*. The *Extravagance* of an *unlimited Commerce*, and the *Danger* of an *arbitrary Search* was diſclaimed on both Sides; and it was found that a little Prudence might prevent all *national Inconveniences*, and anſwer all *equitable Ends*.

Whoever is converſant with the former Maxims of the *Spaniſh* Government *adopted* by *Pride*, and *rivetted* by *Prejudice*, cannot help being aſtoniſh'd at the wonderful

derful Revolution in their Politics, which has ſo far deſtroy'd their hereditary Prepoſſeſſions, that the *Engliſh* Navigation all over *America* is as ſecure as it is in *Europe*, and as free as it ever will be the *Intereſt of the fair Traders in this Kingdom* to wiſh it. To what is all this owing, but to the ſteady Adherence of his Majeſty and his Miniſters to *Rights*, diſtinguiſh'd from *Claims*, and to *Juſtice* ſeparated from *Clamour*? This begot the *Reſpect*, the *Confidence*, and the *Friendſhip* of *Spain*, and ſhe was lately put to Trial, in which we cannot ſuſpect her Sincerity; a Trial which ſucceeded to the Confuſion of our *foreign*, and the Diſappointment of our *Domeſtic*, Enemies.

Such is my Attachment to the *Liberty of the Preſs*, ſuch is my Regard to the *Voice of the Public*, that I readily admit both to have greatly contributed to this moſt deſirable Event, which I moſt ſincerely think, never could have taken

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Place, but by the *Spaniards* being made thoroughly ſenſible, that the *true Intereſt* of the *King* and *People* of *England* are inſeparable. But, if the *Liberty of the Preſs* has been ſo inſtrumental to *eſtabliſh*, ſhall it be perverted to *deſtroy*, this important Friendſhip? Shall it *demoliſh* its *Trophies*, and *diſgrace* its *Triumphs*, by denying the *happy Effects* it has *produc'd*, and by *diſclaiming* the *ſalutary Syſtem* it has *eſtabliſh'd*?

The above are a few of my Reaſons why I think the *Liberty of the Preſs*, if employ'd againſt *Spain*, or indeed againſt our preſent Connexions with that Court, can only operate to deſtroy what it was intended to preſerve, I mean our commercial Intereſt in its Capital Branches.

Some Governments *may be* ARBITRARY, but all Governments *muſt be* ABSOLUTE; the Difference is, that the former *may* be directed by *perſonal Caprice*, while the other *may* reſt upon *conſtitutional Principles*.

ciples. The *former*, therefore, admit of many Circumſtances in which the Intereſts of the *Governor* and the *Governed* may not only be *ſeparate*, but *incompatible*; the *latter* may know no ſuch Diſtinction: Or, to ſpeak in the excellent Terms of our old Law Books, the Powers of the former are *Signorial*, and thoſe of the latter may be *Political.*

There can therefore, properly ſpeaking, be no Foundation for the faſhionable Diſtinction of a *foreign* and *domeſtic* Intereſt in *Great Britain.* *Prerogative* itſelf, in Matters that may eſſentially affect the Public, however *independent* it may be as to its *Exerciſe*, never can operate *fatally* in its Effects. The *Romans* in their Republican State, ſometimes gave their Magiſtrates a much higher *Prerogative* than any King of *England* can conſtitutionally enjoy. The Form of conferring this Prerogative, *viz. Caverent, ne quid detrimenti Republica caperet*, gave them great Liberties of doing *Miſchief*, as well as *Good*, to their Country;

try; and it ſometimes was abuſed. But the Prerogative of a King of *England*, who reigns conſtitutionally, never can operate to the Detriment of his Subjects: For it is no other than a *diſcretionary* Power, which, though not *determinable* is *canvaſſable*; and though not limited *in Time*, is circumſcribed by *Law*.

Such is the Light in which, as a Friend to the *Liberty of the Preſs*, and the *Freedom of Debate*, I have conſidered all our late Differences about the *foreign* and *domeſtic* Intereſts of *Great Britain*. I have, as a public Writer, applied myſelf earneſtly to find a recent Inſtance, in which *Prerogative* had precluded *Privilege*. But, to my great Diſappointment, I found, that though his Majeſty, in conſequence of that ſalutary Power with which his Prerogative inveſts him, had entered into ſeveral public Meaſures, yet all of them had been ſubmitted to Parliament, which is the *Great* and the *dernier Reſult in our Conſtitution*. I ſaw Parliament examine them

freely and candidly; no Member's Power of Speech controuled; no Man's Right of judging impeached. I had ſeen upon many, and thoſe no trifling Occaſions, the Adminiſtration divided in *Sentiments*, yet united in *Intereſt*; and a great Miniſter ſo moderate as to bear with Oppoſition, even from thoſe who ſat at the Board where he preſided, (a Phenomenon never ſeen in *England* before) yet no Attempt was made by *Power* to influence *Opinion*.

But, in public as in private Matters, it is eaſy to diſtinguiſh between *Conſcience* and *Obſtinacy*; between *Sincerity* and *Deſign*; I ſay this Diſtinction is eaſily made by obſerving the whole Tenor of a Gentleman's Conduct. If, to Day, he oppoſes Meaſures, which ſome time before he had fondly embraced; if he firſt *rigidly* diſclaims, and then *warmly* purſues an Intereſt, without any viſible Difference intervening, either as to the *Juncture*, or the *Propriety* of the Meaſure, it is neither *difficult* nor *uncharitable* to gueſs at the Motives of ſuch an Oppoſition. I can

can readily admit, that one Gentleman may differ with another upon Measures, and yet both sincerely wish the same Thing, *The Service of the public.* Nay, I can go farther, and grant, that a Juncture may happen so as to alter the Complexion of a Measure, and that a Minister or Member, may, with great Consistency of Character, oppose *to day*, that which he voted for *yesterday*. I shall go so far as even to admit, that, upon good Grounds, he may alter his Opinion, and honestly hold his Face to the Difference of his Sentiments; because the Judgment of every Man is fallible.

But, in all such Cases, the Motives are easily discernible; and when they are so, an honest Man will candidly explain them. *Principles*, however, are not so *pliable* as *Circumstances*, and a Gentleman may, with much better Address, alter his Opinion of a Measure upon the *latter*, than upon the *former*. I will explain what I mean, by a single Instance.

The Act of Settlement ſays, " That " in caſe the Crown, and imperial Dignity " of this Realm ſhall hereafter come to " any Perſon, not being a Native of this " Kingdom of *England*, this Nation be " not obliged to engage in any War for " the Defence of any Dominions or Ter- " ritories, which do not belong to the " Crown of *England*, without the Con- " ſent of Parliament ?" Here, I can readily ſee a Diſtinction between *Circumſtances* and *Principles*; it is plain, that the Intention of the Legiſlature was not to preclude itſelf from ever taking any Concern in the *Affairs of the Continent*; nay, not even from engaging in a War for the Defence of his Majeſty's foreign Dominions. Notwithſtanding this, two Gentlemen may, with very ſincere and upright Intentions for the Service of the Public, differ upon the Conſtruction of the very Clauſe, I have juſt now quoted.

One may think, that it is, and always will be the Intereſt of *Great Britain* to

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interpoſe ſo far *in the Affairs of the Continent*, as to preſerve a proper Balance of Power there. He may think, with me, that we ought not to permit the moſt inconſiderable Ally or Friend we have there, to ſuffer on Account of his Connections, be they what they will, with *Great Britain*. Nay, the more inconſiderable that a Friend or Ally is, it becomes us the better to ſupport him with Vigour and Spirit. Notwithſtanding all this, the ſame Gentleman may have great Doubts as to the Propriety of Circumſtances, and even oppoſe our entering into Engagements under one Situation of Affairs, which Engagements he might readily vote for, were Circumſtances altered.

This, I ſay, may be the Opinion of one Gentleman, and that too with the beſt Intentions for his Country. But another, with the ſame good Intentions, may found his Oppoſition to our taking Part in the Affairs of the Continent not upon

upon *Circumſtances*, but *Principles*. He may think that no Juncture can occur to juſtify our engaging in any War on Account of Territories upon the Continent; and, no Doubt, as a Member of Parliament, he may oppoſe any ſuch Engagement.

Were I to ſee a Gentleman at his firſt ſetting out in Life, to lay down this as a Principle, and afterwards perſevere in it, without regarding Junctures or Circumſtances, whatever Opinion I might have of ſuch a Gentleman's *Head*, I could have no bad one of his *Heart*.

But were I to ſee another Gentleman an Advocate for *every* Connection with the Continent, that can engage us as Principals in a War there; ſhould the ſame Gentleman, after a long Series of inconſiſtent Conduct, which was viſibly influenced, not by any *Conjuncture of Affairs abroad*, but by the *Situation of the Miniſ-*

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try at *Homo*, all at once adopt the Principle, that our Connection with the Continent, *even in the ſmalleſt Degree*, is ruinous to *Great Britain*, I own I ſhould be uncharitable enough, to put a very indifferent Conſtruction upon the Motives of ſuch a Gentleman's Oppoſition.

But, it may be ſaid, that we are not to judge of Motives; that every Queſtion ought to reſt upon its own Bottom, and be examined by its own Merit. It may be farther urged, as it has been urged in print, *that our engaging at this Time in Conſequence of the Meaſures purſued by his Majeſty when he was laſt abroad, is an open Violation of the Act of Settlement:* "*And opens a Gate for the Admiſſion of* "*the ſame Confuſion, which brought on* "*the Revolution.*" But how does this Parallel hold? The Confuſion that brought on the Revolution, was occaſioned by the King's diſregarding the Diſtinction, I have already laid down from our

our old Law-Books between a *ſignorial* and a *political* Government. In ſhort, he openly avowed his Intention to rule, not only *without* Law, but *againſt* Law, and to render this Conſtitution not *abſolute* in itſelf, but *arbitrary* within his own Breaſt. This, I ſay, was his profeſſed and avowed Purpoſe; a Purpoſe ſo deteſtable in itſelf, that he could find but one Miniſter, I mean *Jeffreys*, who was weak and wicked enough, to carry it into Execution.

This is an Obſervation I make for the Honour of the People of *England*. Even ſome Papiſts, and ſome who afterwards were Nonjurors to King *William*'s Government, declined to comply with, or rather ſtrenuouſly oppoſed, the Madneſs of his Meaſures. Diſguſt and Deſpondency were viſible through all Ranks and Degrees of Men; nor have I to this Day heard of any Advocate ſo bigotted to his Meaſures as to offer to defend them.

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But ſuppoſing that King *James* had made no other Uſe of his Prerogative than to form a Connection upon the Continent, which was to be approved of or diſapproved of by Parliament, and that he had fairly ſubmitted it to their Conſideration. Suppoſing this Meaſure had been of a ruinous, burdenſome, and diſgraceful Nature, yet ſo long as it was in the Power of Parliament to preſerve the Nation from the Ruin, the Burden, and Diſgrace of it, are we to imagine that Things would have run into ſuch Confuſion; as to have brought on a Revolution?

If Gentlemen will come to the Point fairly and rationally ſtating the Nature of the Clauſe in the Act of Settlement, which I have already quoted, the Public (of whom not one in a Hundred underſtand it) would be ſoon diſabuſed, with regard to the mighty Outcry it has occaſioned. I ſhall readily admit the

People to be entitled to certain inherent Rights, which no Act of the Conſtitution ought to violate; nay, I am not ſure whether there are not certain *Pacta Conventa*, which the Parliament itſelf may not think proper to alter. But theſe *Pacta Conventa* are eaſily diſcernible by their admitting of no Exception; and, to ſay the Truth, they are either eſtabliſhed in the very Eſſence of natural Liberty itſelf, or they muſt have been form'd by two ſeparate independent Powers, which Separation and Independency no longer exiſt; for if they exiſt, they certainly have as much Right to *alter*, as they had to *enact*; ſince both depend upon mutual Conſent. For this Reaſon it is, that I look upon ſome Proviſions, both in the *Magna Charta*, and the Articles of Union between *England* and *Scotland*, as being fundamental. And though I cannot go ſo far as to ſay, that if they were altered or annulled by Parliament I would not acquieſce, yet, I am free e-

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nough to own, that I ſhould give my Vote againſt their being wantonly ſubjected to *any* Determination.

This, I think, is venturing as far upon the Principles of Liberty as any Man can go, and perhaps much farther than many are willing to go. But does the Nature of the Act of Settlement imply any Immutability of this Kind? And does not common Senſe tell us, that the Clauſe, "againſt this Nation being obliged to engage in any War for the Defence of any "Dominions or Territories, which do not "belong to the Crown of *England*," is meerly diſcretional, and not fundamental. There is indeed a *fundamental*, and, I think, an *indiſpenſable*, Principle in the ſame Clauſe, which is, *That this Nation be not obliged to engage in any War, for the Defence of any Dominions or Territories, which do not belong to the Crown of* England, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT. But the Fundamentality here

here lies in the laſt *five Words*. Had Parliament intended that our not engaging in any War upon the Continent in Defence of any Dominions or Territories which do not belong to the Crown of *England*, ſhould have been one of the *Pacta Conventa* in this Conſtitution, it would have been laid down without any Qualification. But far from that, it is plain from the very Words of the Clauſe, that they ſuppoſed it *poſſible*, nay, *probable*, that a Conjuncture might happen, when the Parliament might think it proper and neceſſary, to engage in a War, *for the Defence of Dominions or Territories not belonging to the Crown of* England.

This, ſurely, is putting the Caſe in the moſt unfavourable and unpopular Light; but yet it is warranted by the expreſs Words of the Legiſlature. But how does the Matter ſtand in Fact and Reality? His Majeſty was obliged to vindicate the Honour and Intereſt of his Crown

Crown and People, to reſent againſt *France* the Injuries ſhe had offer'd to both; and unwilling that the common Enemy ſhould diſtreſs the Nation in one Quarter, while he was redreſſing her in another, he enters into Engagements. For what?———To maintain upon the Continent that Balance of Power which has always been the Intereſt of *England* to preſerve. If the Preſervation of this is connected with that of *Hanover*, I honeſtly own, we have then a double Tye to endeavour it. But nothing can be more abſurd than to debate only one Part of a Queſtion, without regarding the whole. The whole Queſtion in this Caſe is, *whether it is not proper, upon this Occaſion, to take ſuch a concern in the Affairs of the Continent, as to provide for the Safety and Security of our Allies?* This, I ſay, is the whole of the Queſtion, but Gentlemen have reduced it to a partial, and, I think, not quite fair, Conſideration. viz. *whether*

we

we are to engage for Subsidies merely to defend Hanover?

This laſt Queſtion could have no weight, and could beget no Attention, was any Proteſtant Prince in *Europe* beſides his Majeſty, Elector of *Hanover*, and cloſely connected with *Great Britain* upon every Principle of Public Liberty, and nobly determined to venture his All in its Defence. Had he declared this determination not in Words only, but by entering into the moſt provoking Meaſures againſt the Enemy, by expoſing his Dominions, nay his Perſon when the Honour and Intereſt of *England* requir'd it, with what Face could a Proteſtant Member of the Britiſh Legiſlature whether Whig or Tory, ſtand up and ſay "Let us neglect this Ally, let him do for "himſelf, let the Powers, who are bound "to maintain the Peace of *Germany*, pro"tect him; let *France* attack him; what "is that to us? So much the better. "Such an Attempt will ſeem only

"dra

" draw again upon her a general Confede-
" racy, which muſt reduce her of Courſe;"
All this is very fine Speculation, but it
will no more anſwer in Practice than a
battering Ram would againſt a Platform
of Cannon. Is the preſent Syſtem of
Power in *Europe* the ſame now, as when
the Grand Alliance was form'd, when it
was the Intereſt of every Prince in *Germa-*
ny, be he Popiſh or Proteſtant, to join it?
I am afraid it is not; and that it would be
morally, or at leaſt politically impoſſible,
had *Germany* been left expos'd, to detach
the moſt powerful Elector in the Empire
from its Connections with *France*. The
Public is apt to be ſtrongly influenc'd by
general Notions, and conſequently to ima-
gine, that they influence Princes likewiſe.
Nothing can be more plauſible than to
ſay, " That it never can be the Intereſt
" of *Pruſſia* to ſee *France* too powerful in
" the Empire, and to deſtroy the Conſti-
" tution of the *Germanic* Body, and that
" it muſt be the Intereſt of every Prince

" of

" of the Empire to join againſt any ſuch " Attempts." This, I ſay is a general and a plauſible way of Reaſoning, but we have ſeen it fail in every Inſtance almoſt this laſt twenty Years.

Mean while, I am as far as any Gentleman can be, from thinking that the King of *Pruſſia*, or even the *Gallican* Party in the Empire, would wiſh to ſee *France* too powerful there. Yet who knows but *Pruſſia* may effect by *France*, that which *France* cannot effect by *Pruſſia*? Whoever has ſeriouſly obſerv'd, I will not ſay the *Conduct* but the *Behaviour* of that Prince (for the latter relates to his *Perſon*, as the former does to his *Policy*) may eaſily perceive the Diſtruſt he has of the Court of *Vienna*, and that he thinks nothing but an intimate Connection with *France* can ſecure to him the Poſſeſſion of *Sileſia*. This opinion muſt be founded upon his imagining, that the Houſe of *Auſtria* never will forgive him for making himſelf

Maſter

Maſter of that Dutchy. That it never can be the Intereſt of *France* to abandon him, and that, ſhould he abandon *France*, he muſt ſtand, in the Empire, almoſt ſingle and unbefriended.

But will Gentlemen ſay, that tho' the Syſtem of Power may be upheld on one Side, it may not be in danger of tumbling on the other? Will they pretend to affirm, that even the ſecuring to himſelf the Poſſeſſion of *Sileſia*, is the only View his *Pruſſian* Majeſty has in his Attachments to *France*? Has nothing perſpired? Has nothing even been declared, that ſhews *Sileſia* not to be the *Ultimatum* of his Ambition? And that proves there are other Powers in *Germany* not quite ſecure from his Demands. What Conſtruction are we to put upon his Manifeſto concerning the *Sileſia* Loan? Upon his Complaints of Indignities *done to his Flag*? Upon Claims that have been *blind-*

ly diſperſed, and *not obſcurely* avowed, and upon the Officers, the Miniſters, and the Agents he has employ'd? But above all, how are we to interpret his diſregard of all Advances that have been made to revive in him a Confidence in the Court of *Vienna*, and to re-eſtabliſh thoſe Connexions which Nature and ſound Policy point out to him with regard to *Great Britain*.

Having ſaid thus much, I am ſenſible I ſeem to have gone farther than many Gentlemen on the ſame Side of the Queſtion with myſelf, will admit to be fact. Notwithſtanding this, I am, in the Main, of the ſame Opinion with them; and that it is by no Means impoſſible to regain the Houſe of *Brandenburgh* from its obſtinate Adherence to the Intereſt of *France*. But I think at the ſame Time, that this never can be effected, but by ſtrengthening the Intereſt of *Great Britain* upon the Continent, ſo as to leave him as little as poſſible either to *hope or to fear* from *France*. This

is the true Measure that is to be pursued, and this Measure has been answer'd, by those Engagements which his Majesty has form'd upon the Continent, and which have been approved of by the British Parliament. Supposing, for the sake of Argument, that those Engagements had not been form'd, and that, to speak in the Language of certain Gentlemen, *Germany* had been left to shift for itself. What must have been the Consequence, with what Face, and indeed with what Safety, could the King of *Prussia* have oppos'd *France*, if she had made an Attempt upon *Germany*, convinced, as he seems to be, that the present Situation of the Germantic Body, and the secret Dispositions of the Court of *Vienna*, would render it dangerous, nay, next to Madness in him, to throw himself into the Arms of the House of *Austria*, and to trust to its Forgiveness and Generosity for possessing the finest Part of his Dominions? No Power upon the Continent has Interest and Abilities

enough, even ſuppoſing his *Pruſſian* Majeſty to detach himſelf from *France*, to throw in a Counterpoize to the Arms and Influence of *France*, in the preſent Situation of Things in *Germany*. Neither the Finances nor the Circumſtances of the Houſe of *Auſtria* admit of her taking the lead in a War in *Germany* at a Time when the Election of a King of the *Romans* depends upon ſo many undetermined Events; when *France* is ſo powerful in the Diet of the Empire, and when the State of Affairs in the *Turkiſh* Government is ſo very uncertain, that the Queen of *Hungary*'s Officers towards *Turkey*, when they lie down in Peace at Night, are not ſure whether they may not be awakened by a War next Morning. Mean while, we muſt ſuppoſe *France* to be devoid of all Manner of Ambition and Reſentment, ſuppoſing his Majeſty had not a Foot of Dominions in *Germany*, if ſhe did not ſeek to indemnify herſelf, for the immenſe Loſes ſhe has ſuffer'd at Sea. But

how

how is this Indemnification to ariſe? Undoubtedly by diſtreſſing our Intereſt and attacking our Allies upon the Continent, by availing herſelf of her Engagements with the Northern Courts, by clogging our Trade and diſcouraging our Subjects. Our Fleets, had they been much more powerful than they are, could not have prevented one of thoſe undeſireable Events from taking place, had *Germany* been left defenceleſs.

Will a Shadow of common Senſe countenance us in imagining, that if his Majeſty had taken no Meaſures for the defence of the Britiſh Intereſts upon the Continent, the King of *Pruſſia* would have dar'd to have withſtood the Ambition of *France* in executing the moſt deſtructive Schemes, not only to the Liberties of *Europe*, but to the Commerce of *England* (I ſhall ſpeak nothing of her Honour and Reputation) both in *Germany* and all over the North?

Let

Let us ſuppoſe that his Majeſty had not engag'd in the Service of *Great Britain*, or in his own Service (for, in this Caſe, the difference is only in Sounds) a ſingle *Ruſſian* or *Heſſian*, what muſt have been the Conſequence? Would *France* have reſiſted the tempting Proſpect of obtaining *Revenge*, if not *Reparation*, for the Loſes and Mortifications ſhe has ſuffer'd by a Conduct, which above all his Predeceſſors, has entitled his Majeſty to the Appellation of the PATRIOT *King*; for none of them was fortunate enough to be in ſo *trying* a Situation, as equally to deſerve it,

It is, I ſay, againſt all Experience and Reaſon to think that *France* would have reſiſted ſuch a Temptation, favour'd as ſhe is by one great Northern Power, and befriended by another; the Houſe of *Auſtria* without *Means*, the Princes of the Empire without *Inclination* to reſiſt her. In ſuch a Situation, let us admit that the King of *Pruſſia* opens his Eyes to his Danger,

ger, and to that of the Empire. But how is he to proceed? Is he, contrary to all his Maxims, and to all the appearing Conviction he has of his own Intereſts, to apply to the Queen of *Hungary* for Aſſiſtance? It is ridiculous to imagine he will. Rather than do it, will he not make Terms for himſelf and become a *Lucrative* Acceſſary? Mean while, I am afraid, that under the preſent Circumſtances of *Europe* and the Empire, the Houſe of *Auſtria* and *Brandenburgh* united, would be unable to make Head againſt *France*, and that ſhe might work her Ends before an Union of the Germantic Body could be form'd ſtrong enough to oppoſe her with any Appearance of Succeſs. Look into the Hiſtory of the laſt Century, there you may ſee what Difficulties and delays the Plan of the Grand Alliance underwent before it could be carried into Execution tho' form'd and purſued by Princes, who with vaſt *Abilities* and *Power* had as much *Intereſt* in forming it at firſt, as they diſcovered

covered *Zeal* in *ſupporting* it afterwards; and though *Holland* was then both forward and able to become a principal contracting Power. But no one can be abſurd enough to think that the ſame Diſpoſitions animate the preſent Princes of *Europe*, that the ſame Intereſts influence them, or the ſame Abilities ſupport them, as did at the End of the laſt, and the Beginning of this Century.

Upon the whole, therefore, it is chimerical to imagine, that ſuch an Union amongſt the Powers of *Europe* (if at all practicable) could be form'd ſoon enough to prevent *France* from executing the moſt deſtructive Schemes againſt public Liberty, and the Gentlemen who are againſt the ſubſidiary Treaties, entered into by his Majeſty, muſt, (if they mean any Thing but Oppoſition) be reduced to one of the two following Abſurdities. Either that *France* does not intend to diſturb the Peace of *Europe*, on account of her Differences with *England*, or that her Power may be baffled without our

taking

taking any Part in the Quarrel. To do Juſtice to the Gentlemen at the Head of the Oppoſition, I have heard none of them ſo unreaſonable as to maintain the former Opinion, and the latter has been diſguiſed in ſuch a Manner, as plainly indicates a Conſciouſneſs, that were it ſpoken fairly and openly out, no Man of ſenſe, who is the leaſt converſant in the Hiſtory of the paſt, or the State of the preſent, Times, but muſt be ſtartled at the Propoſition.

Taking therefore, for granted, what the moſt moderate in the Oppoſition am to admit of, that the Interpoſition of *Great Britain* in the Affairs of the Continent, as Matters are there circumſtanced at preſent, is abſolutely neceſſary to prevent the Ruin of the *Britiſh* Intereſt and Commerce there, and to maintain the general Liberties of *Europe*; I ſay, taking it for granted, the Gentlemen who oppoſe his Majeſty's Meaſures, are pretty much in the ſame Caſe with King *Pyrrhus*, who, after conquering *Greece*, *Sicily* and *Italy*, intended to ſit down at Eaſe, and enjoy his Friend and his Bot-

tle: *And pray*, ſaid his Miniſter, *what is to hinder you from doing that now?*

In like Manner, why are we to make wanton Experiments, and indulge chimerical Projects, without coming, at once, to the Point, to which we muſt neceſſarily come at laſt? Who can pretend to ſay, that we may not dally too long, till it is out of our Power to repair the Evils we might have prevented, or, at leaſt, till the Remedy had been attended with a Danger and Expence too formidable and too heavy for *Great Britain* to bear? The ſubſidiary Meaſures his Majeſty has entered into, though attended with an Expence that is but trifling, when compared to their Importance, I will venture to ſay, opens a Proſpect of the leaſt chargeable and moſt durable Tranquillity; or, if Tranquillity is not to be purchaſed, of the moſt immediate and the moſt effectual Oppoſition that can be made to the Ambition of *France*, ſhould ſhe attempt to invade the Liberties of *Europe* at this Juncture.

For, admitting as much as the Gentlemen in the Oppoſition can contend for

that his *Pruſſian* Majeſty is perfectly ſenſible of his own Danger, as well as that of the Empire, ſhould *France* pour her Armies into *Germany*, nay, admitting that he is equally ſenſible on the other Side, that it is by no Means for his Intereſt that fifty or ſixty thouſand *Ruſſians* ſhould penetrate into the Empire; yet will he not be in a much better Condition to talk to *France*, when he is ſure of being ſupported by thoſe *Ruſſians*, than when he is not? And will *France*, ſuppoſing that, (which I hope is no Suppoſition) to be the Caſe, venture to ſay, *I have been injured in* America, *and upon the Ocean by* Great Britain, *and I am reſolved to be revenged upon her Friends in* Germany, *by falling into the Empire with my Armies?* Should his *Pruſſian* Majeſty, were *France* to uſe that Lauguage, be joined only by Friends whom he *dreads*, and Allies whom he *diſtruſts*, with what Face, with what Appearance of Succeſs, could he ſtand in the Gap, and ſay to *France*, *I am intereſted in preſerving the Peace of the Empire, and I will not ſee it invaded?* On the other Hand, ſhould he but drop

the leaſt Intimation of his Unwillingneſs to ſee a *French* Army in the Heart of the Empire, it is inconſiſtent with common Senſe, to imagine that *France* will provoke him, when ſhe knows that he is ſure of being backed by *Great Britain* and her Allies in oppoſing her.

Gentlemen, therefore, conſider the Caſe of his Majeſty's ſubſidiary Engagements in a wrong Light, when they imagine, they are *primarily* calculated to lead *Great Britain* either into an Expence or a War. Their Intention upon the very Face of the Treaties, appears to be quite the Reverſe, becauſe they are form'd ſo, as to prevent both. For by the fourth Article of the Treaty of *Peterſburgh*, *Sept.* 30, 1755, *No military Motions are to take place, unleſs his* Britannic *Majeſty or his Allies are attacked*, Which is ſaying in other Words, " That if *France* " does not diſtreſs the Allies of *Great* " *Britain*, on Account of the Reſentment " which the King of *Great Britain* has " ſhown for the Injuries ſhe has offered " his *Britiſh* Subjects, (and this is the " only Pretext *France* has, or can have,

to

to act hoſtily in *Europe*) " the Troops " in the Pay of *Great Britain*, are not " to ſtir." The third Article of the Treaty of *Hanover*, *June* 18, 1755, contains a like Stipulation.

If it is demanded what is the Expence which this Nation incurs by thus providing for, and, to all Appearance, ſecuring the Peace of *Europe*, the Anſwer is, about 139,000 *l.* a Year, of which about 100,000 *l.* goes to *Ruſſia*, and the reſt to the Landgrave of *Heſſe Caſſel*. A Sum ſo inconſiderable, that if we conſider the former Expences of the Wars upon the Continent, in which *Great Britain* has been engaged, it is ſcarce diſcernible in the Account; and I will venture to ſay, never would have been mentioned in a Parliamentary Debate, had the Elector of *Hanover*, inſtead of being the King, been only the Ally, of *Great Britain*.

It has been ſaid, and ſaid in Print too, by ſome of the moſt violent Oppoſers of the Treaties I have mentioned, that " we have no Allies upon the Continent, and

that

" that the Treaties we have concluded, are
" Treaties not with Allies, but Subſidiaries."

But this is a Diſtinction ariſing from a groſs Miſtake, for I ſhould be ſorry to impute it to a worſe Cauſe. Gentlemen, who pretend to underſtand the commercial Intereſt of this Country the beſt, are, as I have often obſerved, totally ignorant of Treaties of all Kinds, though they form the very Baſis, on which all Commerce is founded. They are too much intent upon the *practical* and *profitable* to give themſelves Leave to examine the *regulated* and the *equitable*. I mean to bring no Impeachment at all againſt their Underſtanding, when I inform them that there is a wide Difference between *mercenary* and *ſubſidiary* Troops. Every *Subſidiary* is an *Ally*, and every *Ally* may be a *Subſidiary*. *Mercenary* Troops may be taken into Pay, and may be employed in whatever Services, and to whatever Purpoſes their Payments ſhall direct. But Troops that are brought *in Subſidium*, are no other than Troops that are employed to do the Buſineſs, which the Power who

ys them, muſt, by Virtue of an Alli-
nce, have done himſelf, had they not
een employed. They, therefore, have a
urpoſe and a Deſtination in Conſequence
f that Alliance; and upon that Principle
was, that the ſubſidiary Troops in the
y of *Great Britain*, when the Peace of
trecht was concluded, refuſed to obey
e Duke of *Ormond*'s Orders, when he
clared a Ceſſation of Arms with *France*.
ad Gentlemen thrown their Eyes upon
e Treaty of *Peterſburg*, they muſt have
en, that an Alliance between his Ma-
ſty and the Empreſs of *Ruſſia*, is the
ry Baſis of all the ſubſidiary Clauſes,
d directly in the Terms of the Act of
ttlement. The 5th Article ſays, that,
In Caſe the Dominions of his *Britan-
nick* Majeſty in *Germany* ſhould be in-
vaded, on Account of Intereſts or Diſ-
putes, which regard his Kingdoms, her
Imperial Majeſty declares, that ſhe
will look upon ſuch an Invaſion as a
Caſe of the aboveſaid Alliance of 1742,
and that the ſaid Dominions ſhall be
therein comprized in this Reſpect."

The

The Parliament of *Great Britain* has conſidered this Article in the Senſe I have given it; and it is amazing it ever ſhould be ſuggeſted, that her *Ruſſian* Majeſty is not in the ſtricteſt Meaning of the Word, an Ally of *Great Britain*, ſince ſhe is engaged to defend "thoſe Territories in "*Germany*, that may be attacked on Ac- "count of Intereſts or Diſputes regard- "ing *Great Britain*."

But Gentlemen are aware of the Neceſſity of defending our commercial Intereſts in the North, if we would act as a trading People, or upon the Principles of the wiſeſt Adminiſtrations of paſt Times; and, therefore, have declined combating the general Maxim. They have, however, endeavoured to ſet it aſide, by ſaying that our Trade in the North is not worth protecting, becauſe the Balance of it is againſt us. But this is an Argument that can have no Weight, unleſs they make it appear, that that Balance ever was in our Favour more than it is at preſent.

But Gentlemen will give me Leave to advance a Paradox, that may ſtartle thoſe who have not conſidered the real Fact, which is, that in many Articles of our Commerce in the North, the more the Balance of Trade is againſt us, the more we are Gainers. The Reaſon is plain. We take from them few, or no, Luxuries of Life; for the Commodities we bring from thence, are abſolutely neceſſary for carrying on our own Manufactures, and the greater the Demand for our Manufactures is, the greater will be our Demand for Materials from the North, and conſequently the more we ſhall have to pay them in Balance.

This is no uncommon Caſe in private Trade. *A*, *B*, and *C*, are three Merchants; *B* manufactures for *C*, but he muſt have the Materials of his Manufacture from *A*; but upon every Pounds worth of Materials which he takes from *A*, he is a Gainer, upon its being manufactured, of 30 *per Cent.* from *C*. At the End of the Year *A* and *B* ſettle Ac-

compts, and it appears that *A* has take
from *B* no more than 1200 *l.* in Comm
dities, but *B* has taken from *A* to th
Amount of 1500 *l.* but at the ſame Tim
B is a Gainer by *C*, 30 *per Cent.* upon th
Materials he had from *A*, after they we
manufactured. If this is a Caſe, as i
diſputably it is, that happens every D
in private Trade, muſt not *B* be ruine
if he is prohibited from having any f
ther Dealings with *A*, notwithſtandi
the Balance is againſt *B*? As this Caſe
eaſily applicable to our own Commerce
the North, I hope it needs no further Ill
tration, and that Gentlemen who are
quite Maſters of commercial Diſpu
will not ſuffer themſelves to be impo
upon by Terms that, however ſpeci
have really no Meaning, but to miſlea

The Importance of our preſerving
Commerce in the North, is viſible to
ſhorteſt ſighted, if not blinded by Pr
dice, Intereſt, or Reſentment. Nor
the keeneſt Oppoſers of our ſubſi
Meaſ

Meaſures, pretended, that *France* and her Allies are not in a Condition to ruin it, ſhould not *Great Britain* interpoſe. It reſts therefore upon them to prove, that ſhe could have interpoſed in a more cheap and effectual Manner than ſhe has done, or that ſhe could have formed any Engagements leſs expenſive, leſs dangerous, and more natural than thoſe ſhe has formed. But not a Syllable of this has been attempted to be proved either in debating or writing. An Outcry has been raiſed againſt *Hanover*; no Regard has been paid to thoſe general Maxims that our wiſeſt and greateſt Princes at all Times have purſued; while old Syſtems have been diſclaimed, no new ones have been propoſed; when Argument was ſilenc'd, Invective took Place; the Diſpute turn'd not upon *Things*, but *Perſons*; and the Notions that had been propagated for but *three* Months, were oppoſed to the Experience that had prevailed for *as many* Ages.

Such

Such, my Lord, are my Reasons why I cannot act any other Part than that of an OCCASIONAL PATRIOT, that is, I am determined *not to be always in the Opposition.* I have ſurvey'd this Queſtion in all Lights; and as I can, by no Manner of Means, bring myſelf to think, that in the preſent Conjuncture, *Great Britain* ought to give up all Kind of Concern with the Continent, I cannot oppoſe the Meaſures concerted by his Majeſty for preſerving the Peace of *Europe.* It is in that Light alone I conſider them, and I am a Friend to them, becauſe I ſincerely, and from my Heart think, they will ſave an infinite deal both of Blood and Treaſure to *Great Britain.* I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient Servant